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Abstract
In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B.J.
Strawser1 argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or
indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the
case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore,
they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much
good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that
their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what makes an
agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I
argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact
undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the
reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference
to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this
position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint
of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at
core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying
that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding
to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons
significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose
of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why
intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing
the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as
an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether.
Keywords: Just War Theory, Intentions, Actions
1 Introduction
According to St. Thomas Aquinas, three things are necessary for a war
to be just: first, the authority of the prince; second, a just cause; and
third, “it is required that those who wage war should have a righteous
intent”.2 In contemporary just war theory, the first requirement, right
authority, has seen much criticism, as non-state actors and civil up-
risings are increasingly seen as legitimate (or at least capable of acting
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legitimately in a military capacity).3 The second and third requirements
have, however, retained their status as cornerstones of what it means for
a war to be just.
In this essay I challenge the third requirement, right intention, and
argue that within the morality of war, intentions only matter insofar
as they affect the actions one chooses to undertake, thereby altering
outcomes. I proceed by examining the argument presented by Purves et
al. [14], which attempts to demonstrate that within the morality of war,
an agent’s reasons for action can decisively alter the moral assessment of
the actions carried out by said agents. I argue, pace Purves et al., that if
two agents will carry out exactly the same actions bringing about exactly
the same consequences, then those agents’ actions must be found equally
moral or immoral. This, however, should not be taken as a an indictment
of intentions altogether. Indeed, I argue that intentions do matter, as
they provide the basis for determining the moral character of an agent.
Put differently, intentions matter morally, but not with respect to the
permissibility of actions, only with respect to the moral assessment of
an individual’s character. I close by clarifying that, practically speaking,
intentions will have an impact on the moral assessment of most acts of
killing or war, but only because the intentions driving action generally
impact on the actions undertaken; i.e. the intentions themselves do not
matter for the moral assessment of acts, but the effect they have on
choices and outcomes does. It is also worth highlighting at the outset
that the arguments provided only deal with moral assessments in war.
As such, the critique of intentions should not be confused with more
general debates concerning intentions and morality.
2 Just War Theory and Right Intention
As mentioned above, the requirement that war be undertaken with a
right intention is an old one, found in the works of Aquinas and Augus-
tine before him,4 and it is still accepted by prominent theorists today.5
Right Intention is an ad bellum constraint, which maintains that for a
war to be just, it must, among other things, be fought with the right
intention.
Generally, this is understood as demanding that a war be fought
for the sake of its just cause.6 That is, if my country is invaded by
an aggressive neighboring state which is bent on exterminating some
of our population, then this provides a just cause for defensive war.
Our war would be fought with a right intention if we entered it for
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the sake of this just cause, and not for some other ulterior motives, like
economic advantage or a plan to annex some of our aggressive neighbor’s
territories. It is important to point out here that this does not necessarily
mean that these other reasons for war must be absent. After all, one
can enter a war in order to resist aggression or assist others in doing so,
as the United States did in entering World War II, while also welcoming
the fact that war will help improve one’s economic situation. Instead,
what right intention requires is that the effective motive be securing the
just cause, and that any other possible motives be given a lexically lower
rank, such that they cannot impinge on the right intention.
However, right intention, while often only listed as an ad bellum re-
quirement for war to be just7 also comes in an in bello formulation as
well.8 After all, if a war’s being just requires that it be entered for the
sake of the just cause, then an action in war’s being just should also be
taken for the sake of furthering the just cause. Moreover, in bello right
intention is also a cornerstone of the traditional notion of a just war, for
as Augustine says, “[t]he desire to do harm, the cruelty of vengeance,
an unpeaceable and implacable spirit, the fever of rebellion, the lust to
dominate, and similar things: these are rightly condemned in war”.9
What in bello right intention demands is that each soldier and comman-
der make his or her decisions with the intent of securing or furthering
some moral goal. However, it does not necessarily mean that each soldier
and commander actually in fact furthers a moral goal, because the war
they are fighting may lack justification altogether. Right intention is a
subjective requirement, concerned only with what is inside an agent (in
that it concerns mental states and attitudes), and so it may be satisfied
even by agents who fight patently unjust fights. All that is required is
that they have a personal intent to do good or promote good, even if
they are mistaken.
For example, suppose one of Rommel’s soldiers firmly believes that
Germany was wronged in the Treaty of Versailles, and that Hitler’s war is
thereby justified as a means to redress that past wrong. We may roundly
reject this claim, but the soldier believes it, and has some reasons to
substantiate his position (even if they are weak or false reasons). Based
on this “just cause”, the soldier joins the Wehrmacht and goes out to
fight, with the intent of helping to redress that past wrong. In this case,
the soldier acts for the sake of furthering a just cause, even though there
is in fact no just cause to be furthered.
This may seem counterintuitive at first, but it becomes clear if we
concentrate on the fact that the requirement is about intentions, and
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not justifications. Rommel’s soldier fights with a good intent, but his
ignorance or misapprehension of the facts makes him unjustified nonethe-
less.10 In this way, right intention can come apart from just cause or
justified action, because the two deal with different categories of things:
the former concerns internal mental states, whereas the latter deals with
facts and outcomes as well.
So, according to the requirement of right intention, for a war to be
ad bellum just, it must be the case that the war is entered for the sake
of securing the just cause. For an action in war to be just, it must be
the case that the agent acts for the sake of furthering a just cause. Put
differently, a just war is one entered with the intent of securing justice;
a just act in war is one which is carried out with the intent of furthering
justice. However, neither of these requirements imply that the war or act
really are just. All that matters for these requirements are the intentions
and expectations internal to the agent. Whether those intentions and
expectations track to anything true or morally good in the world is
another matter, and one which is captured by other just war constraints
(e.g. just cause, proportionality, necessity).
A final point worth noting is that the ad bellum and in bello for-
mulations of right intention are structurally identical. Both say that an
agent (either a state or an individual soldier) is required to have the right
intentions (either securing or promoting what the agent determines to
be just) when doing what is normally a forbidden act (entering war or
killing others). If this is satisfied, along with all other just war criteria,
then the act may be deemed permissible. Given that the two conditions
are identical in form and content, and differ only in scale, any problems
found with one formulation will imply problems for the other as well.
This point will become important in the arguments to follow.
3 Acting for the Right Reasons
Now, with right intention and its in bello variant spelled out, we can
begin looking more closely at the argument provided by Purves et al.
Their argument focuses on the morality of using autonomous weapons in
war, but in making their case they present a more general claim about
how reasons affect the morality of actions in war. The core of their
argument is the thought experiment Racist Soldier, which is set up as
follows:
Imagine a racist man who viscerally hates all people of a cer-
tain ethnicity and longs to murder them, but he knows he
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would not be able to get away with this under normal condi-
tions. It then comes about that the nation-state of which this
man is a citizen has a just cause for war: they are defending
themselves from invasion by an aggressive, neighboring state.
It so happens that this invading state’s population is primar-
ily composed of the ethnicity that the racist man hates. The
racist man joins the army and eagerly goes to war, where he
proceeds to kill scores of enemy soldiers of the ethnicity he
so hates. Assume that he abides by the jus in bello rules of
combatant distinction and proportionality, yet not for moral
reasons. Rather, the reason for every enemy soldier he kills
is his vile, racist intent.11
Purves et al. contend that given the state of this man’s intentions,
we have a strong moral reason to not deploy him to the front, because of
the fact that he will be killing for such heinous reasons. More than this,
they contend that “if we had a choice between deploying either Racist
Soldier or another soldier who would not kill for such reasons, and both
would accomplish the military objective, we would have a strong moral
reason to choose the nonracist soldier.”12
Now, it is important to make clear exactly what Purves et al. are
claiming, as the though-experiment conjures up a number of emotional
responses and intuitions. First of all, the point is not that the racist
soldier kills more people, or innocent people, or uses means which are
unnecessarily harmful. Obviously, any of these things would present a
problem for deploying such a man, but these various actions would be
problematic on a number of just war theoretic grounds. Furthermore,
those actions would be condemned on both strictly consequentialist and
strictly deontological grounds, and so the example would not help illu-
minate the supposed moral value of acting for the right reasons. What
the example maintains is that the racist soldier acts in precisely the same
way as a non-racist soldier would act. The things he does and the out-
comes he brings about are identical with those that any other soldier
in his position would bring about, even if he were replaced by the most
virtuous soldier available. The problem then is not what he does or even
how he does it, but rather why he does it.
Second, Purves et al. are arguing not just that the racist soldier acts
in a way which is morally problematic, but also that those who send him
into combat act in a way which is morally problematic. After all, the
claim is that if we were choosing between racist soldier or some other
soldier, “we would have a strong moral reason to choose the nonracist
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soldier”.13 The fact that “we... have a strong moral reason” not to
send him means that his racist intent changes the moral decision that
we make as well.
Finally, it is crucial to note that the point Purves et al. are arguing
for is not that the character of the racist soldier is morally flawed (though
I am sure they would agree to this), but rather that his actions are. It
is obvious that there are moral deficiencies to the character of the racist
soldier, since he is, ex hypothesi, racist. However, Purves et al. want to
argue for more than this. They maintain that there is something wrong
with us sending him to fight, and also with his fighting, because “he is
acting for the wrong reasons”.14 If their argument was only meant to
indicate some flaw in his character, then they could provide the title of
the thought experiment – Racist Soldier – and leave it at that. However,
they aim to show more; that his racism affects the moral assessment of
his actions as well. More than this, they argue that his actions are wrong,
even though they are the same actions another nonracist soldier would
be carrying out. Given this, it is clear that the argument of Purves et al.
is meant to show that two identical actions with identical outcomes can
have different moral statuses, simply because the agents had different
reasons for carrying out those actions.
4 Right Actions - Right Agents
However, have Purves et al. gotten things right? Is it really true that the
intentions an agent has when acting affect the moral status of the action?
More importantly, can two actions with identical outcomes really be
judged to have different moral statuses? I argue that the answer to all
of these questions is “no”.
Let us proceed by examining where intentions matter most, and then
seeing whether this can help us to understand the role, or lack thereof,
of intentions in evaluating actions.15 It should be uncontroversial that
intentions clearly and significantly impact our moral assessments of an
agent’s character. If there are two people who do the same thing, but
do so for radically different reasons, there may be disagreement about
whether or not both actions have the same moral value or status, but all
would agree that the moral character of these two agents differ greatly.
To see this, let us briefly consider an example.
Suppose that two men see a young boy floundering in the waves and
both rush in to save the him. The first man does so simply because he
saw a child drowning and knows he has a moral duty to save drowning
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children (even if it means the copy of “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”
stuffed into his pants pocket is ruined). The second man, however, only
swims out in the hopes that the boy’s grateful parents will give him some
sort of reward. He is what we might call a “bounty lifeguard”.16 Now,
I take it that most would say both men act correctly, i.e. they perform
the right action, though I am sure there are some who might quibble
about that judgment. However, one thing that is obvious in this case
is that the second man is not nearly as good as the first. Put in less
colloquial terms, he demonstrates a flawed moral character, because his
only reason for action is personal gain, and moral considerations hold
no motivating power for him, even when he sees a child drowning and
could save that child with virtually no negative consequences for himself
(other than having wet clothes for a bit).
So, intentions definitely do matter morally, at least with respect to
the evaluation of an individual’s moral character. Acting for the right
reasons demonstrates a well developed moral sense, and is to be praised,
while acting for the wrong reasons demonstrates an atrophied or even
absent moral sense, and is to be blamed or even perhaps punished.
What of the actions themselves though? How are we to judge these
given differences in the reasons which motivate them? Let us again
consider a pair of cases, what I will call the noble kamikaze and the
sadistic marine. The noble kamikaze fights in WWII for the imperial
Japanese army out of a sense of honor, loyalty, duty to country, and so
forth. Put shortly, he fights for whatever reasons the reader finds to be
good civic/moral traits. His fighting is helping to sustain a war machine
that has ravaged China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands, but
he fights for good reasons. The sadistic marine, on the other hand,
fights because he gets a kick out of hurting others. Since he was a small
child, he has always loved hurting others, and the opportunity to crawl
through the jungles with a rifle and little oversight gives him exactly
what he has always wanted. However, in fighting, he is helping to thwart
tyranny, liberate conquered peoples, and halt grave human rights abuses
in Southeast Asia and China.
In these two cases, there are three things we can already say with con-
fidence and without (great) controversy. First, the noble kamikaze acts
wrongly, because, no matter what his intentions are, he is furthering
grave injustice by assisting in the wholesale subjugation and destruction
of entire populations.17 In fact, we need know nothing about his inten-
tions to make this judgment, because his actions are already in violation
of a number of other criteria of just war theory.18 Second, despite the
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wrongness of his actions, the noble kamikaze does have a good intention,
and on this ground should be judged as having a good moral character,
or at the very least, as having a better moral character than agents who
fight for self-interested or possibly even sadistic reasons. He is wrong in
thinking that it is acceptable to fight for Japan, but he just wants to
do what is right. The indoctrination he received as a child may have
hindered his ability to recognize what is objectively right, but one can-
not doubt that that is his goal. This renders his character morally good,
or at least better than the character of agents without such motivations
and intentions.19 The third thing we can say with certainty is that the
sadistic marine displays a bad moral character. He acts for no other
reason than to harm others, simply because he finds this amusing. Such
sadism shows one of the very worst characters we can imagine, and is
something to be roundly condemned.
There is still one thing we have not spoken to though; the actions
of the sadistic marine. We know he is bad, but are his actions bad as
well? In fighting he contributes to the liberation of many people, helps
to bring down a regime which is tyrannical not just to those it conquers,
but to its own people as well, and he assists in the halting of genocide
and grave rights abuses throughout Southeast Asia and China. These
are all undoubtedly good things, and good things of a significant moral
value.20 However, he only does these things because it allows him to
harm others without fear of punishment. Does this make the actions
themselves morally bad?
I believe not. It would certainly be better if he had a good intention
while doing these things, but the mere presence of a bad one cannot
negate all of the good these actions produce. To see this more fully,
consider the following example:
Ignorant Racist Politician: Suppose there is a politician who
wants to keep minorities down, and ignorantly believes the
best way to do this is to provide them with many social goods.
He thinks that having all these things given to them will
make them dependent on the government, and thereby lower
their self-reliance and long-term welfare. However, as would
be expected, the presence of better schools, stronger infras-
tructure, and better medical care all conspire to improve the
welfare and opportunities of these minorities, thwarting the
politician’s plan.
Now, this scenario is structurally similar to racist soldier (but not
identical). Both act in ways which produce goods, but only act based on
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bad reasons. The main difference is that racist soldier imposes harms
based on bad reasons, whereas ignorant racist politician distributes
goods based on bad reasons. However, both effect a net positive state of
affairs via their actions, and both base their actions on racist sentiments.
I do not believe anyone would honestly or sincerely say that the ignorant
racist politician has done something bad. That is to say, his actions are
good ones. His character is not good, given that his main aim is to harm
minorities, but his ignorance leads him to consistently help those he so
hates. In such a case, his motives will only matter to us insofar as we
are concerned with his moral character or believe that those motives will
impact his future decisions. Therefore, we may seek to replace ignorant
racist politician with another politician who is not racist, but we will
not do this because the former’s actions were bad or wrong. In fact, all
of his actions were good ones which improved the lot of some of society’s
worst off. No, we will seek to replace him because we expect him to do
bad in the future, because of his bad intents or bad reasons for action.
This, however, says nothing regarding the actions he has already carried
out. Ignorant racist politician is simply a bad man who has done good
things accidentally.
Before moving on, it may be worthwhile to consider one final argu-
ment against the position of Purves et al., and one which does not rely
quite as heavily on intuitions and constructed thought-experiments. Let
us return to racist soldier, but restate the main elements in a slightly
more schematic fashion.
Racist Soldier (Revised): Suppose we have two soldiers, one
who is racist and the other who is not. Call them SR and
SNR, respectively. If we send SR to war he will do X. If we
send SNR to war he will do X. The actions they will perform
(X) are identical and the results will likewise be identical.
By hypothesis, Purves et al. claim that the X performed by SNR
would be morally right. This however, is by their own admission the
exact same thing that would be performed by SR. Therefore, it must
also be morally right for him to do it, even if he is doing it for some other
reason. There is nothing that distinguishes one action X from another,
so there cannot be any moral difference between them. Put differently,
if you and I both do the same thing, and what I do is right, then what
you do must be right as well, because of the fact that we both do the
same thing.
Furthermore, we can say this and still maintain that there is some
truth to the sentiment that there is something less good or perhaps
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morally problematic about sending SR to war instead of SNR. However,
the truth behind this sentiment has nothing to do with actions. Rather,
it is grounded in the fact that, all things considered, we prefer good
moral characters over bad ones. This, however, does not entail that the
actions performed because of a bad character are inherently bad. As
such, intentions do not, in principle, matter for the evaluation of acts.
So, an act in war can be morally right even if performed for the worst
of reasons. This is because reasons do not affect the morality of acts,
rather they affect the morality of agents. Two identical acts must have
identical moral statuses. The agents who perform those acts, however,
may have very different moral statuses because of the reasons they had
for acting. In this way, reasons will matter morally, just not with respect
to acts.21
5 Re-examining Right Intention
So far we have been examining individual acts performed by individual
agents who possess some particular moral characters. We have argued
that the intentions of an individual will not affect the moral assessment
of any acts that individual carries out, in virtue of the fact that in-
tentions only matter for the assessment of moral character. What, if
anything, can this tell us about the traditional just war requirement of
right intention?
Recall that right intention is the demand that war be fought for the
sake of its just cause. It is an ad bellum requirement which must be
fulfilled in order for a state’s decision to go to war to be just.22 This,
however, implies that right intention is a requirement on actions, because
the decision to go to war is an action which a state carries out. More
than this, failure to abide by right intention does not imply that a state
is wrong, but rather that the state acts wrongly by waging a war without
having the appropriate motives. This clearly shows that the requirement
is concerned with actions.
However, if what has been argued above holds any truth, then right
intention cannot be maintained, because the intentions of a state do
not matter for the moral assessments of that state’s actions. Just as
an individual agent may act for bad reasons but do a good thing, a
state, which is nothing more than a collective agent, may enter a war
for bad reasons but do a good thing. For example, a state may enter
war purely for territorial gain, but in doing so halt an ongoing genocide
in the region it is annexing. In such a case, we clearly have a reason
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to criticize that state, morally speaking, given that it values territorial
expansion over the preservation of human lives (this is evident in that
its motive is expansion rather than other-defense), but this criticism is
aimed at the state itself, not its war. A war which does good is a good
thing to do, and if there is also a just cause for war, then it is the right
thing to do. This is the case irrespective of the motives which lead a
state to enter war.
This is not to say that a state’s motives are wholly irrelevant though.
We may praise the war itself for saving lives or ending injustice, but
a state which enters war for morally repugnant reasons should be con-
demned and perhaps even punished afterwards. This is because the
state demonstrates a bad moral character, and this bad character gives
us reason to expect that state to be the cause of future wrongs. Again,
as before, the intentions and reasons offered indicate the moral charac-
ter of the agent (in this case, the state), but this does not automatically
translate to the moral assessment of acts, including war, carried out by
said agent.
Therefore, right intention, as it is traditionally understood, cannot
be sustained. It is indeed a good thing, or at least a better thing, for
states to enter wars with good intentions, but only insofar as this makes
the states themselves morally better. Wars, as actions, cannot be judged
based on the internal mental states of those who wage them.23 Rather,
wars, like all actions, must be judged good or evil based on what they
bring about.
6 The Value of Intentions in War and Peace
So far, there has been much argument regarding the ways in which in-
tentions do not matter to the ethics of war and killing. However, there
are numerous ways in which they do matter, and a proper treatment
must make mention of these as well.
We have already indicated throughout that intentions do matter inso-
far as they inform us of the character of an agent. All things considered,
it is morally better to have good moral agents than to have bad ones.
This would even be the case if both types of agents performed exactly
the same actions, all of which were morally good or right. The reason for
this is simple; more good things is better than less. If only the actions
were good, but not the agents themselves, then there would be less good
than if both the actions and the agents were good. For this reason alone,
it is morally preferable to have morally motivated agents rather than
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agents who are motivated by immoral or amoral reasons.
A second reason why intentions do (or may) matter in war, and the
reason which I believe Purves et al. are ultimately getting at, is that
agents who act for the right reasons perform actions which have moral
worth, or at the very least, which have more moral worth.
This idea is rooted in the Kantian ideal that a morally worthy action
is one which is performed from duty. What this means is roughly that
the agent performing the action does so simply because it is the right
thing to do, and not because the agent wants to, or will gain from it, or
is afraid of punishment or social ostracism. The agent recognizes that
the moral law demands a certain response, and acts accordingly, without
requiring any other impetus. This is what, according to Kant, gives an
action moral worth.24 I believe there is some truth to this sentiment, and
to the related idea that actions done for the right reasons are morally
worthier than those which are done for other, perhaps selfish, reasons.25
For example, if I bring my wife flowers to ingratiate myself with her so
that I can get a back rub later, then this seems much less worthy than if
I had done so simply to brighten her day. An act done for purely selfish
reasons, with no regard for the wellbeing of others, does simply seem to
have less moral worth than one which has altruism (or duty) at its core.
In fact, some might reject this scalar notion of moral worth altogether,
going so far as to say that acts of this kind are completely unworthy.
However, the fact that the selfishly motivated action has less moral
worth (or even no moral worth) does not thereby imply that it is wrong.
This is where Purves et al.’s argument goes wrong. They conflate the
moral worth of something with its moral status, but these are distinct
valuations. To see this fully, let us consider a classic example that Kant
himself discusses: helping one’s friends. If I carry out some action to help
my friends because they are my friends, and not because duty demands
it, then this constitutes an action without moral worth. However, this
does not automatically make the action wrong! What makes an action
wrong, according to Kant, is that it violates the requirements of duty,
not that it fails to be motivated by duty. As long as my action is in accor-
dance with duty, it is permissible (perhaps even obligatory), regardless
of my motivations. However, my motivations determine whether this
permissible (obligatory) act is also a morally worthy act. Thus, the two
are distinct and cannot be treated as one and the same. To do so would
absurdly imply that the only morally permissible acts are those that are
morally required, because those are the only actions which can theoret-
ically be motivated by duty. Anything we do which is morally optional
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is incapable of being done from duty – that’s what makes it optional –
and so would by default be wrong if moral worth and moral rightness
were the same. Therefore, the moral worth of an action cannot be used
as an ersatz evaluation of its rightness.26
Another, less heavily Kantian way to explain the distinction is by
way of the concepts of blame and praise. Right and wrong are simply
evaluative. Actions which are right are right, but we do not necessarily
praise those actions. The same holds for actions which are wrong. How-
ever, actions which are done for the right reasons are deserving of praise,
even if they are wrong.27 This is because, by focusing on the reasons for
action, we look to the character of agents, and a good character can
(perhaps ought) to be praised, even when it does evil. We may (perhaps
should) attempt to explain why the wrong action was in fact wrong, but
it still holds a sort of moral worth,28 and this makes it praiseworthy.
The contrary holds for actions which are right but done for the wrong
reasons; we should evaluate them as right, but blame the agent for being
motivated by bad reasons.
To see how this would function, let’s return to the examples of noble
kamikaze and sadistic marine discussed above. We argued that noble
kamikaze acts wrongly, because he furthers grave injustice and violence,
while the sadistic marine acts rightly, because his actions help to save
many and deliver even more from tyranny and oppression. However, the
actions of noble kamikaze are praiseworthy, because they are done from
a motive of duty, honor, loyalty to one’s people or family, etc. Likewise,
we ought to praise the noble kamikaze for no other reason than that he
acts for good reasons. We also have reason to try to convince him he is
acting wrongly, and failing to do that, to fight him, but we can recognize
in him an opponent deserving of respect and honor, and indeed praise.
This sentiment is one which has a long tradition in the history of war and
conflict. Generals and soldiers alike have always differentiated between
just wars and honorable or praiseworthy soldiers. What makes a soldier
honorable or praiseworthy is nothing more than that he fights for the
right reasons, giving his actions a sort of moral worth, and rendering
him worthy of our praise.
The sadistic marine, on the other hand, acts in quite the opposite
way. What he does is right, and we have good reason to encourage him
to continue to do those things. However, his actions hold no moral worth
because they are motivated by the evilest of sentiments. For this reason,
we should disdain him and try our best to help him cultivate a stronger
moral character, which is more inclined to act for the right reasons. We
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shouldn’t hinder his actions which promote the just cause, but we should
try to make him see that his reasons for actions are, morally speaking,
very flawed.
In this way, right actions and morally worthy actions can come apart.
It may be the case that those motivated by the right reasons are more
likely or inclined to do the right thing (and vice versa), but it is equally
possible that good motives lead to wrong actions or that bad motives
lead to right ones.
7 Intentions and Practical Considerations
Before concluding it will be useful to also examine how intentions affect
the practicalities of moral decisions in war. This is especially impor-
tant because war is such an uncertain enterprise, and purely theoretic
discussions which only deal with cases of perfect knowledge or perfect
foresight are likely to lead us astray. A satisfactory account of the just
war must not only tell us what an ideal observer would do or judge to be
right, but must also be useful to those of us who actually have to make
wartime decisions under situations of uncertainty and risk. In discussing
the practical considerations associated with intentions and war, we will
explore two main points; first, a further objection to the argument of
Purves et al., and second, a practical argument for how intentions do
matter for the moral assessment of acts in war.
As argued above, the position of Purves et al. is flawed in that
it mistakes the morality of an agent’s character or the moral worth of
an act with what makes an act right. These are all separate concerns
which relate to different evaluations and different morally relevant things
(acts, outcomes, mental states, intentions). However, the fact that we
are concerned with morality in war gives rise to a practical problem with
the position of Purves et al. as well.
War is a dangerous enterprise, with the possibility of death looming
for nearly every soldier deployed to a combat area, as well as many of
the civilians who regularly accompany fighting men (e.g. security con-
tractors, analysts, engineers, medical professionals, etc.). No matter how
much technological or material superiority a fighting force enjoys over its
enemy, there is always the possibility that one be unlucky enough to be
fatally wounded. Now, all other things being equal, if a certain number
of men will inevitably die as a result of some military engagement and
we are in a position to choose which will die, we have good moral reason
to choose those men who are, as agents, least moral. Put differently, we
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have moral reason to distribute harms to the immoral. To be clear, this
is not to say that immoral agents are deserving of harm or death, or that
we ought to harm or kill them. What this says is that if some must be
harmed or die, better the bad than the good.
At first glance, this likely seems a harsh sentiment, but it is one which
is well grounded in both consequential and deontological ethical theories.
On consequential grounds, the agents with flawed moral characters are
more likely to cause harms (or, more generally, bads) than those with
good characters. At the very least, a good moral agent is more likely
to follow moral rules which, regardless of their particularities, gener-
ally promote welfare, freedom, autonomy, and mutual respect. In short,
good agents promote goods of a wide variety, whereas bad agents may
not. On deontic grounds, we have reason to put bad agents in harm’s
way rather than good ones, because the good ones, in virtue of their
moral development, will almost certainly be more morally innocent and
therefore harms to them will be harder to justify. This is not to say
that all harms to a morally bad agent are by default justified, as this
would undermine much of the morality of war. However, it does mean
that the justification for harming or killing a bad agent need not be as
strong or overwhelming as that needed to justify harming or killing a
good agent, because ex hypothesi the bad agent is less innocent than
his good counterpart. The underlying deontic logic at play here is the
idea of discounting harms based on one’s liability to be harmed. Now,
both the concepts of discounting and liability are well-developed in the
literature and cannot be satisfactorily explored here, but suffice to say
that harms to a fully innocent agent will always count fully, whereas
harms to a partially non-innocent agent may be discounted (as per your
preferred deontic notion of discounting), and as such these harms are
easier to justify morally.29
Now, under the example racist soldier, upon which Purves et al.
build their argument, the racist and non-racist soldiers act in exactly
the same fashion, bringing about exactly the same results. We have
already argued above that this renders their actions exactly the same,
morally speaking. We can now add to this that, pace Purves et al., it
would actually be morally better to deploy racist soldier than it would be
to deploy his non-racist counterpart, because the deployed soldier might
die in combat. Because we know that anyone we send is under a risk of
death, we have good moral reason to send the less moral of two agents
provided they will act in the same ways. In everyday life, this may not
be true – we may always be better off picking the morally superior agent
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in day-to-day affairs. However, because wars involve significant risks of
harm and death, we ought to lay those risks and harms at the feet of
those who are generally morally bad agents provided they will act the
same as morally good agents would.
The caveat, “provided they will act the same as morally good agents”,
brings us to the final point, why intentions do matter morally in the
assessment of actions in war. In all the examples discussed so far, we have
simply assumed that the agents will act in certain ways and have certain
intentions, without making any mention of how the latter may impact
the former. Now, simply assuming that intentions and actions can be
wholly separated and treated in a completely independent fashion is fine
for a theoretical discussion, and can help illuminate subtle distinctions
which are normally not apparent. However, a complete account must
bring them together again, as one’s motivations for action usually do
impact on the actions themselves.
It is in principle possible for a racist and non-racist soldier to both
act in exactly the same way when they fight in war. However, this is
highly unlikely. If a soldier viscerally hates those he is killing, as does the
racist soldier from Purves et al.’s example, then it becomes difficult to
believe that he really will act in exactly the same way as another soldier
who does not share this hatred. We suspect, and rightly so, that the
racist soldier has likely used more force than necessary, or miscalculated
in his proportionality judgments (perhaps because he highly discounts
the moral value of pain inflicted on so-called “lesser” people), or perhaps
targeted those he should not have. In short, we expect him to violate
one of the many norms of war already on the table (e.g. necessity,
proportionality, discrimination) because of his hatred and the fact that
he is only fighting as a result of that hatred.
This is why the intentions and reasons for action do matter in war,
because they alter the courses of action one is likely to take. The racist
soldier will almost certainly not act in the same ways a non-racist soldier
would, and for this reason we believe we should not send him. Granted,
it is natural to say (and perhaps even think) that his bad intentions are
what make it wrong to send him, but when looking to his intentions we
are simply using a shorthand for expressing what we expect him to do.
Because he is racist, we (likely accurately) believe he will violate the
in bello norms of war. This is what makes his actions wrong, not his
intentions. Now, it is true that any violations of the norms of war are
likely a result of his bad intentions, given that another soldier without
those intentions would likely act better. However, what is (possibly)
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wrong with his actions is that they are more likely to violate norms, not
that he has some bad reasons for them.
This is the sense in which intentions do matter to the ethics of action.
Acting based on morally bad reasons increases the likelihood of carrying
out actions which are patently wrong, and this grounds the intuition
that we should not deploy racist soldiers or elect racist politicians. It is
not simply the case that everything the racist soldier or racist politician
does will be wrong because of their racism, but we have good reason to
believe that their racism will make them overlook morally salient features
of certain actions. This is what grounds the belief that their actions are
wrong because they are based on the wrong reasons. However, this does
not say that intentions matter in principle, merely that intentions matter
insofar as they affect actions and outcomes, a conclusion that is at odds
with the claims of Purves et al.
8 Concluding Remarks
If at all possible, we should not deploy racist soldiers, or sadistic marines,
or any agents who we know are acting for the wrong reasons. This, how-
ever, is not because their actions are by default morally wrong. Rather,
agents who act for the wrong reasons are far more likely to act in ways
which are morally problematic. Agents who demonstrate good moral
characters, on the other hand, are likely to follow the norms of war and
only fight as long and as hard as is necessary to secure the just aims.
This is precisely what a theory of the just war demands, and grounds our
thinking that intentions do matter. However, we must always bear in
mind that the intentions only matter for actions insofar as the intentions
actually affect the actions. If two agents really will do exactly the same
things in war, then we ought to deploy the less morally developed of the
two, given that every soldier faces serious risks of harm and death. In
order for it to be plausible that intentions matter in principle, it must
be shown that it is better to impose a risk of death on a virtuous agent,
even though his evil counterpart would have done just as well in his place.
Until such an argument is presented, we ought to judge actions in war30
based on outcomes alone, and only use intentions to judge the character
of agents.
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Notes
1 [14].
2 [1] pp. 240–241.
3 See, e.g., [5, 6, 15].
4 See [1] p. 240 and [2] p. 217.
5 Right Intention is explicitly discussed in [13, 12] and [18], and finds its way into
many discussions of morality and war via the doctrine of double effect. See, for
example, [4] and [8].
6 A notable exception to this understanding is provided in [16]. Steinhoff persua-
sively argues that “a just cause is not an end to achieve, but a set of conditions
that the war satisfies”(p. 39), and as such, one can at most fight with a just
cause, but not for a just cause. Steinhoff’s arguments are compelling and I
fully agree with his conclusions, but they represent a minority position, and so I
choose to follow the standard interpretations of just cause and right intention in
order to make the arguments as broadly applicable as possible. At any rate, the
conclusions I reach align perfectly with Steinhoff’s.
7 See, e.g. [7] p. 67.
8 [16] pp. 39–41.
9 See [1] p. 241, citing Augustine. Augustine and Aquinas both make further
mention of in bello conceptions of right intention. See, for example [2] pp. 217,
226 and [1] pp. 218, 241–242.
10 Some so-called just war “traditionalists” may take issue with the claim that
Rommel’s soldiers fight unjustly, as the justness of a war itself is argued to be
irrelevant to the justness of particular acts in war. However, for the sake of
brevity, we will ignore this debate. For the classic formulation of the traditionalist
position, see [18], esp. ch. 3. For more current exposition of the traditionalist
position, as well as objections to it, see [3] and [11] respectively.
11 [14] pp. 860.
12 Ibid, emphasis added.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 I begin in this way because arguments attempting to directly show that intentions
do (not) matter morally for the evaluation of action tend to be circular and
Nathan G. Wood: Deploying Racist Soldiers 71
unconvincing. For example, Purves et al. simply assume that their thought-
experiment, racist soldier, demonstrates that intentions matter in this way, when
in fact it could be used to demonstrate the exact opposite, provided one has
contrary intuitions. By starting with the examination of where intentions clearly
do matter, it will be possible to more conclusively say where they do not matter.
16 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example to me.
17 Again, just war traditionalists like Walzer may take exception to this, because of
their commitment to the moral equality of combatants thesis, which maintains
that the justness of conflict is irrelevant to the permissibility of individual soldiers’
fighting in that conflict.
18 In this way, there is also a disturbing asymmetry to the principle of right in-
tention or acting for the right reasons, because while bad intentions/reasons
supposedly taint the moral status of an otherwise good act, such that it becomes
impermissible, good intentions cannot raise an otherwise bad act to the level of
permissibility.
19 Some may think that the kamikaze’s failure to recognize the unjustness of the
war he is fighting renders his moral character “bad”. Put differently, failure to
reason well about moral facts is, according to the objection, a flaw in one’s moral
character. However, this confuses epistemic flaws for moral ones. The kamikaze
fights because he wants to do what is right, but he is epistemically unable to
correctly judge what is in fact right (likely due to factors outside his control; e.g.
propaganda). This epistemic failing does not necessarily or implicitly translate
to a moral failing. At the very least, the epistemic failing cannot wholly taint
his moral intentions, so his character is at least better than that of another agent
without such motivations.
20 Whether we are concerned with value in terms of quality or quantity, the goods
the sadistic marine contributes to are certainly of a high order.
21 Compact arguments along similar lines reaching similar conclusions can be found
in [16] pp. 39–41 and [17] pp. 27–28.
22 Note that the traditional aim of right intention was not ensuring that a state
acted justly, but rather reconciling the practice of war with Christian values and
principles. “Hence Augustine says: ‘Among true worshippers of God, those wars
which are waged not out of greed or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace
by coercing the wicked and helping the good, are regarded as peaceful.”’ ([1] p.
241) Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this.
23 Whatever it may mean to discuss the “internal mental state” of a state.
24 [9], 4:390 and 4:398.
25 For an insightful exploration of the value of intentions and reasons for action, as
well as the distinction between acting from duty vs. acting for the right reasons,
see [10].
26 For an excellent treatment of Kant’s moral philosophy, see [19]. For the explicit
discussion of the differences between from duty and in accordance with duty, as
well as work on how motivations and moral worth relate to these concepts, see
sections 3–4 of chapter 1, pp. 26–42.
27 Note that it is crucial that we discuss actions done for the right reasons and not
morally worthy actions, as moral worth is conferred only on actions which are
done from duty, and so presupposes that the action is morally right. Therefore,
it does not allow for this type of fine-grained examination.
72 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, 2018, 32(1): 53–74
28 Again, the qualification is necessary in virtue of the point made in the above
endnote.
29 For an in-depth influential discussion of discounting and liability see [11], espe-
cially Chapter 4.
30 Again, it is worth stressing that the arguments presented are only meant to apply
to cases of war and killing. Intentions may matter in principle in everyday moral
decisions, as there is no, or at least less, risk for the agent acting.
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